Анђели и све о Анђелима

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Укуцај у претраживачу , изаће пар тема о анђелима

Нашао сам двије теме:

 

https://www.pouke.org/forum/topic/4945-%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B0%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%B7%D0%B0%D0%B2%D0%B5%D1%82%D0%BD%D0%B0-%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%B3%D0%B5%D0%BB%D0%BE%D0%BB%D0%BE%D0%B3%D0%B8%D1%98%D0%B0/

 

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Има и књига https://www.pouke.org...id=416&do=view# , али не ради линк.

 

Хвала. Можда наиђем на њу некад у некој књижари

 

Нашао сам и дјело Томе Аквинског, "Summa Theologica", у коме има читаво једно поглавље посвећено анђелима. Поставићу шта сам ту нашао.

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TREATISE ON THE ANGELS (QQ[50]-64)
OF THE SUBSTANCE OF THE ANGELS ABSOLUTELY CONSIDERED (FIVE
ARTICLES)
Now we consider the distinction of corporeal and spiritual creatures: firstly, the purely spiritual
creature which in Holy Scripture is called angel; secondly, the creature wholly corporeal; thirdly,
the composite creature, corporeal and spiritual, which is man.
Concerning the angels, we consider first what belongs to their substance; secondly, what belongs
to their intellect; thirdly, what belongs to their will; fourthly, what belongs to their creation.
Their substance we consider absolutely and in relation to corporeal things.
Concerning their substance absolutely considered, there are five points of inquiry:
(1) Whether there is any entirely spiritual creature, altogether incorporeal?
(2) Supposing that an angel is such, we ask whether it is composed of matter and form?
(3) We ask concerning their number.
(4) Of their difference from each other.
(5) Of their immortality or incorruptibility.
Whether an angel is altogether incorporeal?

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Objection 1: It would seem that an angel is not entirely incorporeal. For what is incorporeal
only as regards ourselves, and not in relation to God, is not absolutely incorporeal. But Damascene
says (De Fide Orth. ii) that "an angel is said to be incorporeal and immaterial as regards us; but
compared to God it is corporeal and material. Therefore he is not simply incorporeal."
Objection 2: Further, nothing is moved except a body, as the Philosopher says (Phys. vi, text
32). But Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) that "an angel is an ever movable intellectual substance."
Therefore an angel is a corporeal substance.
Objection 3: Further, Ambrose says (De Spir. Sanct. i, 7): "Every creature is limited within its
own nature." But to be limited belongs to bodies. Therefore, every creature is corporeal. Now angels
are God's creatures, as appears from Ps. 148:2: "Praise ye" the Lord, "all His angels"; and, farther
on (verse 4), "For He spoke, and they were made; He commanded, and they were created." Therefore
angels are corporeal.
On the contrary, It is said (Ps. 103:4): "Who makes His angels spirits."
I answer that, There must be some incorporeal creatures. For what is principally intended by
God in creatures is good, and this consists in assimilation to God Himself. And the perfect
assimilation of an effect to a cause is accomplished when the effect imitates the cause according
to that whereby the cause produces the effect; as heat makes heat. Now, God produces the creature
by His intellect and will (Q[14], A[8]; Q[19], A[4] ). Hence the perfection of the universe requires
that there should be intellectual creatures. Now intelligence cannot be the action of a body, nor of
any corporeal faculty; for every body is limited to "here" and "now." Hence the perfection of the
universe requires the existence of an incorporeal creature.

The ancients, however, not properly realizing the force of intelligence, and failing to make a
proper distinction between sense and intellect, thought that nothing existed in the world but what
could be apprehended by sense and imagination. And because bodies alone fall under imagination,
they supposed that no being existed except bodies, as the Philosopher observes (Phys. iv, text
52,57). Thence came the error of the Sadducees, who said there was no spirit (Acts 23:8).
But the very fact that intellect is above sense is a reasonable proof that there are some incorporeal
things comprehensible by the intellect alone.
Reply to Objection 1: Incorporeal substances rank between God and corporeal creatures. Now
the medium compared to one extreme appears to be the other extreme, as what is tepid compared
to heat seems to be cold; and thus it is said that angels, compared to God, are material and corporeal,
not, however, as if anything corporeal existed in them.
Reply to Objection 2: Movement is there taken in the sense in which it is applied to intelligence
and will. Therefore an angel is called an ever mobile substance, because he is ever actually intelligent,
and not as if he were sometimes actually and sometimes potentially, as we are. Hence it is clear
that the objection rests on an equivocation.
Reply to Objection 3: To be circumscribed by local limits belongs to bodies only; whereas to
be circumscribed by essential limits belongs to all creatures, both corporeal and spiritual. Hence
Ambrose says (De Spir. Sanct. i, 7) that "although some things are not contained in corporeal place,
still they are none the less circumscribed by their substance."

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Whether an angel is composed of matter and form?

 

Objection 1: It would seem that an angel is composed of matter and form. For everything which
is contained under any genus is composed of the genus, and of the difference which added to the
genus makes the species. But the genus comes from the matter, and the difference from the form
(Metaph. xiii, text 6). Therefore everything which is in a genus is composed of matter and form.
But an angel is in the genus of substance. Therefore he is composed of matter and form.
Objection 2: Further, wherever the properties of matter exist, there is matter. Now the properties
of matter are to receive and to substand; whence Boethius says (De Trin.) that "a simple form cannot
be a subject": and the above properties are found in the angel. Therefore an angel is composed of
matter and form.
Objection 3: Further, form is act. So what is form only is pure act. But an angel is not pure
act, for this belongs to God alone. Therefore an angel is not form only, but has a form in matter.
Objection 4: Further, form is properly limited and perfected by matter. So the form which is
not in matter is an infinite form. But the form of an angel is not infinite, for every creature is finite.
Therefore the form of an angel is in matter.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): "The first creatures are understood to be as
immaterial as they are incorporeal."

I answer that, Some assert that the angels are composed of matter and form; which opinion
Avicebron endeavored to establish in his book of the Fount of Life. For he supposes that whatever
things are distinguished by the intellect are really distinct. Now as regards incorporeal substance,
the intellect apprehends that which distinguishes it from corporeal substance, and that which it has
in common with it. Hence he concludes that what distinguishes incorporeal from corporeal substance
is a kind of form to it, and whatever is subject to this distinguishing form, as it were something
common, is its matter. Therefore, he asserts the universal matter of spiritual and corporeal things
is the same; so that it must be understood that the form of incorporeal substance is impressed in
the matter of spiritual things, in the same way as the form of quantity is impressed in the matter of
corporeal things.
But one glance is enough to show that there cannot be one matter of spiritual and of corporeal
things. For it is not possible that a spiritual and a corporeal form should be received into the same
part of matter, otherwise one and the same thing would be corporeal and spiritual. Hence it would
follow that one part of matter receives the corporeal form, and another receives the spiritual form.
Matter, however, is not divisible into parts except as regarded under quantity; and without quantity
substance is indivisible, as Aristotle says (Phys. i, text 15). Therefore it would follow that the matter
of spiritual things is subject to quantity; which cannot be. Therefore it is impossible that corporeal
and spiritual things should have the same matter.
It is, further, impossible for an intellectual substance to have any kind of matter. For the operation
belonging to anything is according to the mode of its substance. Now to understand is an altogether
immaterial operation, as appears from its object, whence any act receives its species and nature.
For a thing is understood according to its degree of immateriality; because forms that exist in matter
are individual forms which the intellect cannot apprehend as such. Hence it must be that every
individual substance is altogether immaterial.

But things distinguished by the intellect are not necessarily distinguished in reality; because
the intellect does not apprehend things according to their mode, but according to its own mode.
Hence material things which are below our intellect exist in our intellect in a simpler mode than
they exist in themselves. Angelic substances, on the other hand, are above our intellect; and hence our intellect cannot attain to apprehend them, as they are in themselves, but by its own mode,
according as it apprehends composite things; and in this way also it apprehends God (Q[3]).
Reply to Objection 1: It is difference which constitutes the species. Now everything is
constituted in a species according as it is determined to some special grade of being because "the
species of things are like numbers," which differ by addition and subtraction of unity, as the
Philosopher says (Metaph. viii, text 10). But in material things there is one thing which determines
to a special grade, and that is the form; and another thing which is determined, and this is the matter;
and hence from the latter the "genus" is derived, and from the former the "difference." Whereas in
immaterial things there is no separate determinator and thing determined; each thing by its own
self holds a determinate grade in being; and therefore in them "genus" and "difference" are not
derived from different things, but from one and the same. Nevertheless, this differs in our mode of
conception; for, inasmuch as our intellect considers it as indeterminate, it derives the idea of their
"genus"; and inasmuch as it considers it determinately, it derives the idea of their "difference."
Reply to Objection 2: This reason is given in the book on the Fount of Life, and it would be
cogent, supposing that the receptive mode of the intellect and of matter were the same. But this is
clearly false. For matter receives the form, that thereby it may be constituted in some species, either
of air, or of fire, or of something else. But the intellect does not receive the form in the same way;
otherwise the opinion of Empedocles (De Anima i, 5, text 26) would be true, to the effect that we
know earth by earth, and fire by fire. But the intelligible form is in the intellect according to the
very nature of a form; for as such is it so known by the intellect. Hence such a way of receiving is
not that of matter, but of an immaterial substance.

Reply to Objection 3: Although there is no composition of matter and form in an angel, yet
there is act and potentiality. And this can be made evident if we consider the nature of material
things which contain a twofold composition. The first is that of form and matter, whereby the nature
is constituted. Such a composite nature is not its own existence but existence is its act. Hence the
nature itself is related to its own existence as potentiality to act. Therefore if there be no matter,
and supposing that the form itself subsists without matter, there nevertheless still remains the relation
of the form to its very existence, as of potentiality to act. And such a kind of composition is
understood to be in the angels; and this is what some say, that an angel is composed of, "whereby
he is," and "what is," or "existence," and "what is," as Boethius says. For "what is," is the form
itself subsisting; and the existence itself is whereby the substance is; as the running is whereby the
runner runs. But in God "existence" and "what is" are not different as was explained above (Q[3],
A[4]). Hence God alone is pure act.
Reply to Objection 4: Every creature is simply finite, inasmuch as its existence is not absolutely
subsisting, but is limited to some nature to which it belongs. But there is nothing against a creature
being considered relatively infinite. Material creatures are infinite on the part of matter, but finite
in their form, which is limited by the matter which receives it. But immaterial created substances
are finite in their being; whereas they are infinite in the sense that their forms are not received in
anything else; as if we were to say, for example, that whiteness existing separate is infinite as
regards the nature of whiteness, forasmuch as it is not contracted to any one subject; while its
"being" is finite as determined to some one special nature.
Whence it is said (De Causis, prop. 16) that "intelligence is finite from above," as receiving its
being from above itself, and is "infinite from below," as not received in any matter.

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Whether the angels exist in any great number?

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels are not in great numbers. For number is a species
of quantity, and follows the division of a continuous body. But this cannot be in the angels, since
they are incorporeal, as was shown above (A[1]). Therefore the angels cannot exist in any great
number.
Objection 2: Further, the more a thing approaches to unity, so much the less is it multiplied,
as is evident in numbers. But among other created natures the angelic nature approaches nearest to
God. Therefore since God is supremely one, it seems that there is the least possible number in the
angelic nature.
Objection 3: Further, the proper effect of the separate substances seems to be the movements
of the heavenly bodies. But the movements of the heavenly bodies fall within some small determined
number, which we can apprehend. Therefore the angels are not in greater number than the movements
of the heavenly bodies.
Objection 4: Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "all intelligible and intellectual substances
subsist because of the rays of the divine goodness." But a ray is only multiplied according to the
different things that receive it. Now it cannot be said that their matter is receptive of an intelligible
ray, since intellectual substances are immaterial, as was shown above (A[2]). Therefore it seems
that the multiplication of intellectual substances can only be according to the requirements of the
first bodies---that is, of the heavenly ones, so that in some way the shedding form of the aforesaid
rays may be terminated in them; and hence the same conclusion is to be drawn as before.
On the contrary, It is said (Dan. 7:10): "Thousands of thousands ministered to Him, and ten
thousands times a hundred thousand stood before Him."

I answer that, There have been various opinions with regard to the number of the separate
substances. Plato contended that the separate substances are the species of sensible things; as if we
were to maintain that human nature is a separate substance of itself: and according to this view it
would have to be maintained that the number of the separate substances is the number of the species
of sensible things. Aristotle, however, rejects this view (Metaph. i, text 31) because matter is of
the very nature of the species of sensible things. Consequently the separate substances cannot be
the exemplar species of these sensible things; but have their own fixed natures, which are higher
than the natures of sensible things. Nevertheless Aristotle held (Metaph. xi, text 43) that those more
perfect natures bear relation to these sensible things, as that of mover and end; and therefore he
strove to find out the number of the separate substances according to the number of the first
movements.
But since this appears to militate against the teachings of Sacred Scripture, Rabbi Moses the
Jew, wishing to bring both into harmony, held that the angels, in so far as they are styled immaterial
substances, are multiplied according to the number of heavenly movements or bodies, as Aristotle
held (Metaph. xi, text 43); while he contended that in the Scriptures even men bearing a divine
message are styled angels; and again, even the powers of natural things, which manifest God's
almighty power. It is, however, quite foreign to the custom of the Scriptures for the powers of
irrational things to be designated as angels.
Hence it must be said that the angels, even inasmuch as they are immaterial substances, exist
in exceeding great number, far beyond all material multitude. This is what Dionysius says (Coel.
Hier. xiv): "There are many blessed armies of the heavenly intelligences, surpassing the weak and limited reckoning of our material numbers." The reason whereof is this, because, since it is the
perfection of the universe that God chiefly intends in the creation of things, the more perfect some
things are, in so much greater an excess are they created by God. Now, as in bodies such excess is
observed in regard to their magnitude, so in things incorporeal is it observed in regard to their
multitude. We see, in fact, that incorruptible bodies, exceed corruptible bodies almost incomparably
in magnitude; for the entire sphere of things active and passive is something very small in comparison
with the heavenly bodies. Hence it is reasonable to conclude that the immaterial substances as it
were incomparably exceed material substances as to multitude.
Reply to Objection 1: In the angels number is not that of discrete quantity, brought about by
division of what is continuous, but that which is caused by distinction of forms; according as
multitude is reckoned among the transcendentals, as was said above (Q[30], A[3]; Q[11]).
Reply to Objection 2: From the angelic nature being the nighest unto God, it must needs have
least of multitude in its composition, but not so as to be found in few subjects.
Reply to Objection 3: This is Aristotle's argument (Metaph. xii, text 44), and it would conclude
necessarily if the separate substances were made for corporeal substances. For thus the immaterial
substances would exist to no purpose, unless some movement from them were to appear in corporeal
things. But it is not true that the immaterial substances exist on account of the corporeal, because
the end is nobler than the means to the end. Hence Aristotle says (Metaph. xii, text 44) that this is
not a necessary argument, but a probable one. He was forced to make use of this argument, since
only through sensible things can we come to know intelligible ones.

Reply to Objection 4: This argument comes from the opinion of such as hold that matter is
the cause of the distinction of things; but this was refuted above (Q[47], A[1]). Accordingly, the
multiplication of the angels is not to be taken according to matter, nor according to bodies, but
according to the divine wisdom devising the various orders of immaterial substances.

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Whether the angels differ in species?

 

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels do not differ in species. For since the "difference"
is nobler than the 'genus,' all things which agree in what is noblest in them, agree likewise in their
ultimate constitutive difference; and so they are the same according to species. But all angels agree
in what is noblest in them---that is to say, in intellectuality. Therefore all the angels are of one
species.
Objection 2: Further, more and less do not change a species. But the angels seem to differ only
from one another according to more and less---namely, as one is simpler than another, and of keener
intellect. Therefore the angels do not differ specifically.
Objection 3: Further, soul and angel are contra-distinguished mutually from each other. But
all souls are of the one species. So therefore are the angels.
Objection 4: Further, the more perfect a thing is in nature, the more ought it to be multiplied.
But this would not be so if there were but one individual under one species. Therefore there are
many angels of one species.
On the contrary, In things of one species there is no such thing as "first" and "second" [prius
et posterius], as the Philosopher says (Metaph. iii, text 2). But in the angels even of the one order there are first, middle, and last, as Dionysius says (Hier. Ang. x). Therefore the angels are not of
the same species.
I answer that, Some have said that all spiritual substances, even souls, are of the one species.
Others, again, that all the angels are of the one species, but not souls; while others allege that all
the angels of one hierarchy, or even of one order, are of the one species.
But this is impossible. For such things as agree in species but differ in number, agree in form,
but are distinguished materially. If, therefore, the angels be not composed of matter and form, as
was said above (A[2]), it follows that it is impossible for two angels to be of one species; just as it
would be impossible for there to be several whitenesses apart, or several humanities, since
whitenesses are not several, except in so far as they are in several substances. And if the angels had
matter, not even then could there be several angels of one species. For it would be necessary for
matter to be the principle of distinction of one from the other, not, indeed, according to the division
of quantity, since they are incorporeal, but according to the diversity of their powers; and such
diversity of matter causes diversity not merely of species, but of genus.
Reply to Objection 1: "Difference" is nobler than "genus," as the determined is more noble
than the undetermined, and the proper than the common, but not as one nature is nobler than another;
otherwise it would be necessary that all irrational animals be of the same species; or that there
should be in them some form which is higher than the sensible soul. Therefore irrational animals
differ in species according to the various determined degrees of sensitive nature; and in like manner
all the angels differ in species according to the diverse degrees of intellectual nature.
Reply to Objection 2: More and less change the species, not according as they are caused by
the intensity or remissness of one form, but according as they are caused by forms of diverse degrees;
for instance, if we say that fire is more perfect than air: and in this way the angels are diversified
according to more or less.

Reply to Objection 3: The good of the species preponderates over the good of the individual.
Hence it is much better for the species to be multiplied in the angels than for individuals to be
multiplied in the one species.
Reply to Objection 4: Numerical multiplication, since it can be drawn out infinitely, is not
intended by the agent, but only specific multiplication, as was said above (Q[47], A[3]). Hence the
perfection of the angelic nature calls for the multiplying of species, but not for the multiplying of
individuals in one species.

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Whether the angels are incorruptible?

 

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels are not incorruptible; for Damascene, speaking of
the angel, says (De Fide Orth. ii, 3) that he is "an intellectual substance, partaking of immortality
by favor, and not by nature."
Objection 2: Further, Plato says in the Timaeus: "O gods of gods, whose maker and father am
I: You are indeed my works, dissoluble by nature, yet indissoluble because I so will it." But gods
such as these can only be understood to be the angels. Therefore the angels are corruptible by their
nature
Objection 3: Further, according to Gregory (Moral. xvi), "all things would tend towards nothing,
unless the hand of the Almighty preserved them." But what can be brought to nothing is corruptible. Therefore, since the angels were made by God, it would appear that they are corruptible of their
own nature.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that the intellectual substances "have unfailing
life, being free from all corruption, death, matter, and generation."
I answer that, It must necessarily be maintained that the angels are incorruptible of their own
nature. The reason for this is, that nothing is corrupted except by its form being separated from the
matter. Hence, since an angel is a subsisting form, as is clear from what was said above (A[2]), it
is impossible for its substance to be corruptible. For what belongs to anything considered in itself
can never be separated from it; but what belongs to a thing, considered in relation to something
else, can be separated, when that something else is taken away, in view of which it belonged to it.
Roundness can never be taken from the circle, because it belongs to it of itself; but a bronze circle
can lose roundness, if the bronze be deprived of its circular shape. Now to be belongs to a form
considered in itself; for everything is an actual being according to its form: whereas matter is an
actual being by the form. Consequently a subject composed of matter and form ceases to be actually
when the form is separated from the matter. But if the form subsists in its own being, as happens
in the angels, as was said above (A[2]), it cannot lose its being. Therefore, the angel's immateriality
is the cause why it is incorruptible by its own nature.
A token of this incorruptibility can be gathered from its intellectual operation; for since
everything acts according as it is actual, the operation of a thing indicates its mode of being. Now
the species and nature of the operation is understood from the object. But an intelligible object,
being above time, is everlasting. Hence every intellectual substance is incorruptible of its own
nature.

Reply to Objection 1: Damascene is dealing with perfect immortality, which includes complete
immutability; since "every change is a kind of death," as Augustine says (Contra Maxim. iii). The
angels obtain perfect immutability only by favor, as will appear later (Q[62]).
Reply to Objection 2: By the expression 'gods' Plato understands the heavenly bodies, which
he supposed to be made up of elements, and therefore dissoluble of their own nature; yet they are
for ever preserved in existence by the Divine will.
Reply to Objection 3: As was observed above (Q[44], A[1]) there is a kind of necessary thing
which has a cause of its necessity. Hence it is not repugnant to a necessary or incorruptible being
to depend for its existence on another as its cause. Therefore, when it is said that all things, even
the angels, would lapse into nothing, unless preserved by God, it is not to be gathered therefrom
that there is any principle of corruption in the angels; but that the nature of the angels is dependent
upon God as its cause. For a thing is said to be corruptible not merely because God can reduce it
to non-existence, by withdrawing His act of preservation; but also because it has some principle
of corruption within itself, or some contrariety, or at least the potentiality of matter.

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Whether the angels have bodies naturally united to them?

 

Objection 1: It would seem that angels have bodies naturally united to them. For Origen says
(Peri Archon i): "It is God's attribute alone---that is, it belongs to the Father, the Son, and the Holy
Ghost, as a property of nature, that He is understood to exist without any material substance and
without any companionship of corporeal addition." Bernard likewise says (Hom. vi. super Cant.):
"Let us assign incorporeity to God alone even as we do immortality, whose nature alone, neither
for its own sake nor on account of anything else, needs the help of any corporeal organ. But it is
clear that every created spirit needs corporeal substance." Augustine also says (Gen. ad lit. iii):
"The demons are called animals of the atmosphere because their nature is akin to that of aerial
bodies." But the nature of demons and angels is the same. Therefore angels have bodies naturally
united to them.
Objection 2: Further, Gregory (Hom. x in Ev.) calls an angel a rational animal. But every
animal is composed of body and soul. Therefore angels have bodies naturally united to them.
Objection 3: Further, life is more perfect in the angels than in souls. But the soul not only lives,
but gives life to the body. Therefore the angels animate bodies which are naturally united to them.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "the angels are understood to be
incorporeal."

I answer that, The angels have not bodies naturally united to them. For whatever belongs to
any nature as an accident is not found universally in that nature; thus, for instance, to have wings,
because it is not of the essence of an animal, does not belong to every animal. Now since to
understand is not the act of a body, nor of any corporeal energy, as will be shown later (Q[75],
A[2]), it follows that to have a body united to it is not of the nature of an intellectual substance, as
such; but it is accidental to some intellectual substance on account of something else. Even so it
belongs to the human soul to be united to a body, because it is imperfect and exists potentially in
the genus of intellectual substances, not having the fulness of knowledge in its own nature, but
acquiring it from sensible things through the bodily senses, as will be explained later on (Q[84],
A[6]; Q[89], A[1]). Now whenever we find something imperfect in any genus we must presuppose
something perfect in that genus. Therefore in the intellectual nature there are some perfectly
intellectual substances, which do not need to acquire knowledge from sensible things. Consequently
not all intellectual substances are united to bodies; but some are quite separated from bodies, and
these we call angels.
Reply to Objection 1: As was said above (Q[50], A[1]) it was the opinion of some that every
being is a body; and consequently some seem to have thought that there were no incorporeal
substances existing except as united to bodies; so much so that some even held that God was the
soul of the world, as Augustine tells us (De Civ. Dei vii). As this is contrary to Catholic Faith,
which asserts that God is exalted above all things, according to Ps. 8:2: "Thy magnificence is exalted
beyond the heavens"; Origen, while refusing to say such a thing of God, followed the above opinion
of others regarding the other substances; being deceived here as he was also in many other points,
by following the opinions of the ancient philosophers. Bernard's expression can be explained, that the created spirit needs some bodily instrument, which is not naturally united to it, but assumed for
some purpose, as will be explained (A[2]). Augustine speaks, not as asserting the fact, but merely
using the opinion of the Platonists, who maintained that there are some aerial animals, which they
termed demons.
Reply to Objection 2: Gregory calls the angel a rational animal metaphorically, on account of
the likeness to the rational nature.
Reply to Objection 3: To give life effectively is a perfection simply speaking; hence it belongs
to God, as is said (1 Kings 2:6): "The Lord killeth, and maketh alive." But to give life formally
belongs to a substance which is part of some nature, and which has not within itself the full nature
of the species. Hence an intellectual substance which is not united to a body is more perfect than
one which is united to a body.

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Whether angels assume bodies?

 

Objection 1: It would seem that angels do not assume bodies. For there is nothing superfluous
in the work of an angel, as there is nothing of the kind in the work of nature. But it would be
superfluous for the angels to assume bodies, because an angel has no need for a body, since his
own power exceeds all bodily power. Therefore an angel does not assume a body.
Objection 2: Further, every assumption is terminated in some union; because to assume implies
a taking to oneself [ad se sumere]. But a body is not united to an angel as to a form, as stated (A[1]);
while in so far as it is united to the angel as to a mover, it is not said to be assumed, otherwise it
would follow that all bodies moved by the angels are assumed by them. Therefore the angels do
not assume bodies.
Objection 3: Further, angels do not assume bodies from the earth or water, or they could not
suddenly disappear; nor again from fire, otherwise they would burn whatever things they touched;
nor again from air, because air is without shape or color. Therefore the angels do not assume bodies.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xvi) that angels appeared to Abraham under
assumed bodies.

I answer that, Some have maintained that the angels never assume bodies, but that all that we
read in Scripture of apparitions of angels happened in prophetic vision---that is, according to
imagination. But this is contrary to the intent of Scripture; for whatever is beheld in imaginary
vision is only in the beholder's imagination, and consequently is not seen by everybody. Yet Divine
Scripture from time to time introduces angels so apparent as to be seen commonly by all; just as
the angels who appeared to Abraham were seen by him and by his whole family, by Lot, and by
the citizens of Sodom; in like manner the angel who appeared to Tobias was seen by all present.
From all this it is clearly shown that such apparitions were beheld by bodily vision, whereby the
object seen exists outside the person beholding it, and can accordingly be seen by all. Now by such
a vision only a body can be beheld. Consequently, since the angels are not bodies, nor have they
bodies naturally united with them, as is clear from what has been said (A[1]; Q[50], A[1]), it follows
that they sometimes assume bodies.
Reply to Objection 1: Angels need an assumed body, not for themselves, but on our account;
that by conversing familiarly with men they may give evidence of that intellectual companionship
which men expect to have with them in the life to come. Moreover that angels assumed bodies under the Old Law was a figurative indication that the Word of God would take a human body;
because all the apparitions in the Old Testament were ordained to that one whereby the Son of God
appeared in the flesh.
Reply to Objection 2: The body assumed is united to the angel not as its form, nor merely as
its mover, but as its mover represented by the assumed movable body. For as in the Sacred Scripture
the properties of intelligible things are set forth by the likenesses of things sensible, in the same
way by Divine power sensible bodies are so fashioned by angels as fittingly to represent the
intelligible properties of an angel. And this is what we mean by an angel assuming a body.
Reply to Objection 3: Although air as long as it is in a state of rarefaction has neither shape
nor color, yet when condensed it can both be shaped and colored as appears in the clouds. Even so
the angels assume bodies of air, condensing it by the Divine power in so far as is needful for forming
the assumed body.

[Ћириличар]

Whether the angels exercise functions of life in the bodies assumed?

 

Objection 1: It would seem that the angels exercise functions of life in assumed bodies. For
pretence is unbecoming in angels of truth. But it would be pretence if the body assumed by them,
which seems to live and to exercise vital functions, did not possess these functions. Therefore the
angels exercise functions of life in the assumed body.
Objection 2: Further, in the works of the angels there is nothing without a purpose. But eyes,
nostrils, and the other instruments of the senses, would be fashioned without a purpose in the body
assumed by the angel, if he perceived nothing by their means. Consequently, the angel perceives
by the assumed body; and this is the most special function of life.
Objection 3: Further, to move hither and thither is one of the functions of life, as the Philosopher
says (De Anima ii). But the angels are manifestly seen to move in their assumed bodies. For it was
said (Gn. 18:16) that "Abraham walked with" the angels, who had appeared to him, "bringing them
on the way"; and when Tobias said to the angel (Tob. 5:7,8): "Knowest thou the way that leadeth
to the city of Medes?" he answered: "I know it; and I have often walked through all the ways
thereof." Therefore the angels often exercise functions of life in assumed bodies.
Objection 4: Further, speech is the function of a living subject, for it is produced by the voice,
while the voice itself is a sound conveyed from the mouth. But it is evident from many passages
of Sacred Scripture that angels spoke in assumed bodies. Therefore in their assumed bodies they
exercise functions of life.

Objection 5: Further, eating is a purely animal function. Hence the Lord after His Resurrection
ate with His disciples in proof of having resumed life (Lk. 24). Now when angels appeared in their
assumed bodies they ate, and Abraham offered them food, after having previously adored them as
God (Gn. 18). Therefore the angels exercise functions of life in assumed bodies.
Objection 6: Further, to beget offspring is a vital act. But this has befallen the angels in their
assumed bodies; for it is related: "After the sons of God went in to the daughters of men, and they
brought forth children, these are the mighty men of old, men of renown" (Gn. 6:4). Consequently
the angels exercised vital functions in their assumed bodies.
On the contrary, The bodies assumed by angels have no life, as was stated in the previous
article (ad 3). Therefore they cannot exercise functions of life through assumed bodies.

I answer that, Some functions of living subjects have something in common with other
operations; just as speech, which is the function of a living creature, agrees with other sounds of
inanimate things, in so far as it is sound; and walking agrees with other movements, in so far as it
is movement. Consequently vital functions can be performed in assumed bodies by the angels, as
to that which is common in such operations; but not as to that which is special to living subjects;
because, according to the Philosopher (De Somn. et Vig. i), "that which has the faculty has the
action." Hence nothing can have a function of life except what has life, which is the potential
principle of such action.
Reply to Objection 1: As it is in no wise contrary to truth for intelligible things to be set forth
in Scripture under sensible figures, since it is not said for the purpose of maintaining that intelligible
things are sensible, but in order that properties of intelligible things may be understood according
to similitude through sensible figures; so it is not contrary to the truth of the holy angels that through
their assumed bodies they appear to be living men, although they are really not. For the bodies are
assumed merely for this purpose, that the spiritual properties and works of the angels may be
manifested by the properties of man and of his works. This could not so fittingly be done if they
were to assume true men; because the properties of such men would lead us to men, and not to
angels.
Reply to Objection 2: Sensation is entirely a vital function. Consequently it can in no way be
said that the angels perceive through the organs of their assumed bodies. Yet such bodies are not
fashioned in vain; for they are not fashioned for the purpose of sensation through them, but to this
end, that by such bodily organs the spiritual powers of the angels may be made manifest; just as
by the eye the power of the angel's knowledge is pointed out, and other powers by the other members,
as Dionysius teaches (Coel. Hier.).

Reply to Objection 3: Movement coming from a united mover is a proper function of life; but
the bodies assumed by the angels are not thus moved, since the angels are not their forms. Yet the
angels are moved accidentally, when such bodies are moved, since they are in them as movers are
in the moved; and they are here in such a way as not to be elsewhere which cannot be said of God.
Accordingly, although God is not moved when the things are moved in which He exists, since He
is everywhere; yet the angels are moved accidentally according to the movement of the bodies
assumed. But they are not moved according to the movement of the heavenly bodies, even though
they be in them as the movers in the thing moved, because the heavenly bodies do not change place
in their entirety; nor for the spirit which moves the world is there any fixed locality according to
any restricted part of the world's substance, which now is in the east, and now in the west, but
according to a fixed quarter; because "the moving energy is always in the east," as stated in Phys.
viii, text 84.
Reply to Objection 4: Properly speaking, the angels do not talk through their assumed bodies;
yet there is a semblance of speech, in so far as they fashion sounds in the air like to human voices.
Reply to Objection 5: Properly speaking, the angels cannot be said to eat, because eating
involves the taking of food convertible into the substance of the eater.
Although after the Resurrection food was not converted into the substance of Christ's body, but
resolved into pre-existing matter; nevertheless Christ had a body of such a true nature that food
could be changed into it; hence it was a true eating. But the food taken by angels was neither changed
into the assumed body, nor was the body of such a nature that food could be changed into it;
consequently, it was not a true eating, but figurative of spiritual eating. This is what the angel said to Tobias: "When I was with you, I seemed indeed to eat and to drink; but I use an invisible meat
and drink" (Tob. 12:19).
Abraham offered them food, deeming them to be men, in whom, nevertheless, he worshipped
God, as God is wont to be in the prophets, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xvi).
Reply to Objection 6: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xv): "Many persons affirm that they
have had the experience, or have heard from such as have experienced it, that the Satyrs and Fauns,
whom the common folk call incubi, have often presented themselves before women, and have
sought and procured intercourse with them. Hence it is folly to deny it. But God's holy angels could
not fall in such fashion before the deluge. Hence by the sons of God are to be understood the sons
of Seth, who were good; while by the daughters of men the Scripture designates those who sprang
from the race of Cain. Nor is it to be wondered at that giants should be born of them; for they were
not all giants, albeit there were many more before than after the deluge." Still if some are occasionally
begotten from demons, it is not from the seed of such demons, nor from their assumed bodies, but
from the seed of men taken for the purpose; as when the demon assumes first the form of a woman,
and afterwards of a man; just as they take the seed of other things for other generating purposes,
as Augustine says (De Trin. iii), so that the person born is not the child of a demon, but of a man.

[Ћириличар]

Има још много, много. Она тешка средњовјековна сколастика

[Ignjatije]

Тематика из оне књиге, којој не ради линк, се налази и у књизи "Траговима Писма" од истог аутора. Овде можеш наручити књигу https://www.pouke.org/forum/topic/18882-%D1%82%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%B3%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%B8-%D0%BF%D0%B8%D1%81%D0%BC%D0%B0-%D0%BD%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%B0-%D0%BA%D1%9A%D0%B8%D0%B3%D0%B0-%D0%BF%D1%80%D0%BE%D1%84-%D0%B4%D1%80-%D1%80o%D0%B4%D0%BE%D1%99%D1%83%D0%B1%D0%B0-%D0%BA%D1%83%D0%B1%D0%B0%D1%82%D0%B0/#entry628354

 

Имам је и могу да кажем да је одлична. Само је доста тешка за читање(барем мени). Глава ме заболи неки пут док је читам(буквално).

 

Нисам је нашао у електронској форми, а да је копирам и правим ПДФ фајл за нет... ће ме апсе 

 

Наручи је ако хоћеш. Јефтина је а изврсна.

[DYNABLASTER]

Kako knjiga moze biti odlicna ako te od nje zaboli glava?! Izvrsna je ako si mazohista jes

[Баба]

Дионисије Ареопагит

 

О небеској јерархији

 

Све касније од овога исходи, иначе ово је била једна од најчитанијих књига на српском средњевековном двору.

 

http://www.verujem.org/teologija/dionisije_areopagit_nebeska_jerarhija.htm

[kordun]

Дионисије Ареопагит

 

О небеској јерархији

 

Све касније од овога исходи, иначе ово је била једна од најчитанијих књига на српском средњевековном двору.

 

http://www.verujem.org/teologija/dionisije_areopagit_nebeska_jerarhija.htm

Ja sam tebe Željko pitao nešto iz nebeske jerarhije,tj iz tumačenja te jerarhije,a vezano za Lucifera,preciznije za njegov status,Heruvim ili Serafim,kasnije sam saznao da je i jedno i drugo bio,tj.napredovao je prije pobune...al nisam znao jel to pravoslavno tumačenje ili nije,ne znam ni sada... Prvi dan mog bitisanja na ovom forumu,sijećam si kako si mi odgovorio,pomenuo si da možda indijanska plemenea imaju više informacija od pravoslavlja,odma sam sebi rekao,ovaj ako nije Crnogorac,Ercegovac je sto posto