Saint Thomas Aquinas

[Bernard]

 

[Bernard]

 

[Bernard]

Humilitas est quasi quaedam dispositio ad liberum accessum hominis in spiritualia et divina bona.

Ponižnost je neke vrste človekova pripravljenost na prost dostop do duhovnega in do Božjih dobrin.

(Summa II-II,161.5.4)

 

Humilitas facit hominem capacem Dei.

Zaradi ponižnosti človek postane zmožen (za spoznavo) Boga.

(In Matth.11)

 

Humilitas ad sapientiam disponit.

Ponižnost odpre pot do modrosti.

 (Mal. 8.3.8.)

 

Summa - Summa theologiae

In Matth - Komentar k Matejevem evangeliju

Mal - Quaestiones disputatae de malo

[Bernard]

"Adoro te devote" is a Eucharistic hymn written by Thomas Aquinas.^[1] "Adoro te devote" is one of the five Eucharistic hymns, which were composed and set to music for the Solemnity of Corpus Christi, instituted in 1264 by Pope Urban IV as a Solemnity for the entire Roman Catholic Church.

Since the beginning of its composition and it being set to music, the "Adoro te devote" was chanted as an Eucharistic Hymn during the Saint Mass in honorem SS. Sacramenti (in honour of the Most Blessed Sacrament), as it was written in the Latin manuscripts. So it was also chanted for the Eucharistic adoration.

Strictly speaking, Aquinas seems to have used it also as a private prayer, for a daily adoration of the Blessed Sacrament.

The "Adoro te devote" is one of the medieval poetic compositions, being used as spoken prayers and also as chanted hymns, which were preserved in the Missale Romanum published in 1570 following the Council of Trent (1545–1563).

The "Adoro te devote" is still sung today, though its use is optional in the post-Vatican II Ordinary form.

 

Latin text

literal English translation

Adoro te devote, latens deitas, Quæ sub his figuris vere latitas; Tibi se cor meum totum subjicit, Quia te contemplans totum deficit. Visus, tactus, gustus in te fallitur, Sed auditu solo tuto creditur. Credo quidquid dixit Dei Filius; Nil hoc verbo Veritátis[2] verius. In Cruce[2] latebat sola Deitas, At hic latet simul et Humanitas, Ambo tamen credens atque confitens, Peto quod petivit latro pœnitens. Plagas, sicut Thomas, non intueor: Deum tamen meum te confiteor. Fac me tibi semper magis credere, In te spem habere, te diligere. O memoriale mortis Domini, Panis vivus, vitam præstans homini, Præsta meæ menti de te vívere, Et te illi semper dulce sapere. Pie Pelicane, Jesu Domine, Me immundum munda tuo Sanguine[2] : Cujus una stilla salvum facere Totum mundum quit ab omni scelere. Jesu, quem velatum nunc aspicio, Oro, fiat illud quod tam sitio: Ut te revelata cernens facie, Visu sim beátus tuæ gloriæ. Amen.

I devoutly adore you, o hidden Deity, Truly hidden beneath these appearances. My whole heart submits to You, And in contemplating You, it surrenders itself completely. Sight, touch, taste are all deceived in their judgment of you, But hearing suffices firmly to believe. I believe all that the Son of God has spoken; There is nothing truer than this word of Truth. On the cross only the divinity was hidden, But here the humanity is also hidden. Yet believing and confessing both, I ask for what the penitent thief asked. I do not see the Holy Wounds as Thomas did, But I confess that You are my God. Make me believe much more in You, Hope in you, and love You. O memorial of our Lord's death, Living Bread that gives life to man, Grant my soul to live on You, And always to savor your sweetness. Lord Jesus, Good Pelican, wash my filthiness and clean me with Your Blood, One drop of which can free the entire world of all its sins. Jesus, whom now I see hidden, I ask You to fulfill what I so desire: That the sight of Your Face being unveiled I may have the happiness of seeing Your glory. Amen.

 

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Adoro_te_devote

[Bernard]

In homine duo possunt considerari: scilicet id quod est Dei, et id quod est hominis… Quilibet homo, secundum id quod suum est, debet se cuilibet proximo subiicere quantum ad id quod est Dei in ipso… Non autemhoc requirit humilitas, ut aliquis id, quod est Dei in seipso, subiiciat ei quod apparet esse Dei in altero… Similiter etiam non hoc requirit humilitas ut aliquis id quod est suum in seipso, subiiciat ei quod est hominis in proximo.

V človeku je moč motriti dvoje, namreč tisto, kar je od Boga in kar je od človeka…. Vsakdo bi se moral v tistem svojem delu, ki je od njega samega, podrediti bližnjemu v tistem delu, ki je v njem od Boga…. Ponižnost pa od nikogar ne zahteva, da bi tisto, kar je v njem od Boga, podredili tistemu, kar je dozdevno od Boga v kom drugem…... Pa tudi tega ne zahteva ponižnost, da bi kdo podredil svoj lasti del sebe tistemu, kar je v kom drugem človeškega.

(Summa II-II,161.3)

[Bernard]

Sicut medicus, quamvis exterius operetur natura sola interius operante, dicitur facere sanitatem; ita et homo dicitur docere veritatem quamvis exterius annuntiet Deo interius docente.

Za zdravnika pravimo, da zdravi, čeprav je njegovo delovanje samo zunanje, medtem ko znotraj deluje narava; podobno pravimo, da človek uči resnico, čeprav jo oznanja le od zunaj, znotraj pa jo uči Bog.

(Ver.11.1.7)

 

Homo docens solummodo exterius ministerium adhibet sicut medicus sanans; sed sicut natura interior est principalis causa sanationis, ita et interius lumen intellectus est principalis causa scientiae: utrumque autem horum est a Deo.

Kadar poučuje človek, opravlja zgolj zunanjo dejavnost, podobno kot zdravnik, ki zdravi, toda prav kakor je narava notranji vzrok ozdravitve, je tudi notranja luč uma poglavitni vzrok znanja – oboje je namreč od Boga.

(Summa I, 117.1.1)

 

Scientia nostra …. in nobis acquiritur per hoc, quod res imprimunt similitudines suas in animas nostras; sed in cognitione Dei est e converso, quia ab eius intellectu effluunt formae in omnes creaturas. Unde sicut scientia in nobis est sigillatio rerum in animabus nostris, ita e converso formae non sunt nisi quaedam sigillatio divinae scientiae in rebus.

Svoje znanje pridobimo tako, da stvari vtisnejo svoje podobe v našo dušo; pri spoznavanju Boga pa je ravno obrnjeno, ker iz njegovega uma odtekajo liki v vse stvaritve. Kakor je potemtakem znanje v nas pečat stvari na naših dušah, so obrnjeno, liki preprosto nekakšen pečat Božjega znanja na stvareh.

(Ver. 2.1.6)

 

 

Ver. – Quaestiones disputatae de veritate

[Bernard]

Mala sunt omnibus modis vitanda; et ideo nullo modo sunt mala facienda ad hoc, quod aliqua bona proveniant. Sed bona non sunt omnibus modis facienda; et ideo interdum sunt aliqua bona inetermittenda, ut aliqua magna mala vitentur.

Slabemu se je treba na vse načine izogibati in zato se nikakor ne sme storiti kaj slabega, da bi iz tega nastalo kaj dobrega. Pa tudi dobro se ne sme delati na vsak način, zato je treba občasno opustiti kaj dobrega, da bi ne prišlo do večjega zla.

(Corr.frat. 1.4)

 

Corr.frat. – Quaestio disputata de correctione fraterna

[Bernard]

Prima …. et universalis causa humanae salutis est Verbum incarnatum. Congruum igitur fuit, ut remedia, quibus universalis causae virtus pertingit ad homines, illius causae similitudinem haberent, ut scilicet in eis virtus divina invisibiliter operaretur sub visibilibus signis. (C.G. 4.56)

 

Quia vero mors Christie st quasi universalis causa humanae salutis, universalem autem causam oportet applicari ad unumquemque effectum, necessarium fuit exhiberi hominibus quaedam remedia, per quae eis beneficium mortis Christi quodammodo conuingeretur. Huiusmodi autem esse dicuntur Ecclesiae sacramenta. (C.G. 4.56)

 

Passio Christi est sufficiens causa humanae salitis; nec propter hoc saquitur quod sacramenta non sint necessaria ad humanam salutem, quia operantur in virtute passionis Christi, et passio Christi quodammodo applicatur hominibus per sacramenta. (Summa III, 61.1.3)

 

Antiqui patres salvati sunt per fidem Christi venturi, ita et nos salvamur per fidem Christi iam nati et passi. Sunt autem sacramenta quaedam signa protestantia fidem, qua iustificatur homo. (Summa III, 61.4)

 

Oportet quod virtus salutifera a divinitate Christi per eius humanitatem in ipsa sacramenta derivetur. (Summa III, 62.5)

 

Verbum, per quod omnia sacramenta virtutem habent, habuit carnem et fuit Verbum Dei; et sicut caro Christi habuit virtutem instrumentalem ad faciendum miracula, propter coniunctionem ad Verbum, ita sacramenta per coniunctionem ad Christum crucifixum et passum. (Quol.12.14)

 

Sacramentum … nihil est aliud quamquaedam sanctificatio homini exhibita cum aliquo signo visibili. (Sent. 4, 24.1.1.3.)

 

Manifestum est enim quod per sacramenta novae legis homo Christo incorporatur. (Summa III, 62.1)

 

Sacramentum novae legis est instrumentalis gratiae causa. (Summa III, 62.3)

 

 

C.G. – Summa contra gentes

Summa – Summa theologiae

Quol. – Quaestiones quodlibetales

Sent. – Secundum scriptum super libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi

[Bernard]

 

[Bernard]

Sacramentum ponitur in genere signi. (Summa III, 60.1)

 

Est autem homini connaturale, ut per sensibilia perveniat in cognitionem intelligibilium. Signum autem est per quod aliquis devenit in cognitionem alterius. Unde cum res sacrae, quae per sacramenta significantur, sint quaedam spiritualia et intelligibilia bona, quibus homo sanctificatur consequens est ut per aliquas res sensibiles significatio sacramenti impleatur; sicut etiam per similitudinem sensibilium rerum in divina Scriptura res spirituales nobis describuntur. Et inde  est quod ad sacramenta requiruntur res sensibiles. (Summa III, 60.4)

 

Ad misericordiam eius, qui vult omnes homines salvos fieri, pertinet ut in his, quae sunt de necessitate salutis, homo de facili remedium inveniat. (Summa III, 67.3)

 

Sacramentum signando causat. (Sent. 4, 23.1.1.2)

 

Oportet in sacramentis significationem servari. (C.G. 4.73)

 

Virtus spiritualis non potest esse in re corporea per modum virtutis permanentis et completae, sicut ratio probat. Nihil tamen prohibet incorpore esse virtutem spiritualem instrumentaliter, inquantum scilicet corpus potest moveri ab aliqua substantia spirituali ad aliquem effectum spiritualem inducendum, sicut et in ipsa vocem sensibili est quaedam vis spiritualis ad excitandum intellectum hominis, inquantum procedit a conceptione mentis. Et hoc modo vis spiritualis est in sacramentis, inquantum ordinantur a Deo ad effectum spiritualem. (Summa III, 62.4.1)

 

Sicut iudicio Spiritus Sancti determinatum est, quibus similitudinibus in certis Scripturae locis res spirituales significentur, ita etiam debet esse divina institutione determinatum, quae res ad significandum assumantur in hoc vel in illo sacramento. (Summa III, 60.5.1)

 

Accedente verbo ad elementum fit sacramentum. (Summa III, 66.1.3)

 

Ex verbis et rebus fit quodammodo unum in sacramentis, sicut ex forma et materia, inquantum scilicet per  verba perficitur significatio rerum. (Summa III, 60.6.2)

 

Formae sacramentorum habent virtutem sanctificandi non ex hoc, quod audiuntur, sed ex hoc, quod proferuntur. (Sent. 4, 43.1.2.2.2)

 

Summa – Summa theologiae

C.G. – Summa contra gentes

Sent. – Secundum scriptum super libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi

[Bernard]

 

 

 

[Bernard]

An Introduction to Analogy in St. Thomas' Theology

One common problem among experienced by beginners in theology, especially those who have a more analytical mind but who have no previous theological training, is that they do not understand or know how to handle analogy.  Since they know from q. 1 of the Prima Pars that theology is a science, which uses logic and even the scholastic method, they expect terms to mean the same thing every time St. Thomas uses it.  In the Summa, however, St. Thomas expects his readers to have previously undertaken a comprehensive course of logica and of philosophy in general, where analogy is studied in depth and applied throughout.  So when a reader comes to the Summaexpecting univocity, perhaps because they associate it with logical rigor, they are disappointed and it can become a serious obstacle to understanding the text.

So let me explain analogy briefly for those of you who are not familiar with it (for those of you who are well versed in St. Thomas' logic and metapysics, and are interested in reading more on my take on analogy in Aquinas, I refer you to this old post). 

 

St. Thomas teaches that we can use a term either univocally or equivocally. We use a term equivocally when we use it many times with different meanings. For example, when I say that the tree has bark I mean something quite different form when I say that my dog likes to bark. In these examples, "bark" is being used in a purely equivocal way. On the other hand, we use terms univocally when they have the same meaning: I am writing these words on a computer and you are reading them on a computer. Here "computer" has the same meaning in both instances, and thus it is being used univocally. Now there is a third way to use terms, which is called analogy, but which is really a subset of equivocal terms. For example, I can say that my dog is "healthy" but also that his food is "healthy" and that his urine seems "healthy." Of course the dog's being healthy means that his physiological funcitons are all in normal order; but the food's being healthy does not mean that at all: it means that the food is capable of producing or continuing the dog's being healthy. And the urine's being healthy is not at all healthy in the way his food is healthy: it is healthy in the sense that it is a sign of the dog's being healthy. So in these examples the term "healhty" is being used with different meanings (equivocally), but yet these meanings are so closely related that they constitute a special kind of equivocal term. 

St. Thomas uses analogous terms throughout his discussion of God, and so does all of theology, for that matter. When we say that this steak that I'm eating is "good," and when I say that God is "good," by the term "good" I mean different things. God is not tasty, and the steak is not goodness itself. Goodness is an analogous term. In fact, pretty much all divine attributes are analogous terms: they mean different things when attributed to God and when attributed to creatures. Thus, you as a student of theology and of St. Thomas in particular you need to be always aware of the fact that analogy is ubiquitous. 

 

In Summa theologiae Ia, q. 13, a. 5, we read:

 

Sed contra, quidquid praedicatur de aliquibus secundum idem nomen et non secundum eandem rationem, praedicatur de eis aequivoce. Sed nullum nomen convenit Deo secundum illam rationem, secundum quam dicitur de creatura, nam sapientia in creaturis est qualitas, non autem in Deo; genus autem variatum mutat rationem, cum sit pars definitionis. Et eadem ratio est in aliis. Quidquid ergo de Deo et creaturis dicitur, aequivoce dicitur.	On the contrary, whatever is predicated of various things under the same name but not in the same sense, is predicated equivocally. But no name belongs to God in the same sense that it belongs to creatures; for instance, wisdom in creatures is a quality, but not in God. Now a different genus changes an essence, since the genus is part of the definition; and the same applies to other things. Therefore whatever is said of God and of creatures is predicated equivocally.
Praeterea, Deus plus distat a creaturis, quam quaecumque creaturae ab invicem. Sed propter distantiam quarundam creaturarum, contingit quod nihil univoce de eis praedicari potest; sicut de his quae non conveniunt in aliquo genere. Ergo multo minus de Deo et creaturis aliquid univoce praedicatur, sed omnia praedicantur aequivoce.	Further, God is more distant from creatures than any creatures are from each other. But the distance of some creatures makes any univocal predication of them impossible, as in the case of those things which are not in the same genus. Therefore much less can anything be predicated univocally of God and creatures; and so only equivocal predication can be applied to them.
Respondeo dicendum quod impossibile est aliquid praedicari de Deo et creaturis univoce. Quia omnis effectus non adaequans virtutem causae agentis, recipit similitudinem agentis non secundum eandem rationem, sed deficienter, ita ut quod divisim et multipliciter est in effectibus, in causa est simpliciter et eodem modo; sicut sol secundum unam virtutem, multiformes et varias formas in istis inferioribus producit. Eodem modo, ut supra dictum est, omnes rerum perfectiones, quae sunt in rebus creatis divisim et multipliciter, in Deo praeexistunt unite. Sic igitur, cum aliquod nomen ad perfectionem pertinens de creatura dicitur, significat illam perfectionem ut distinctam secundum rationem definitionis ab aliis, puta cum hoc nomen sapiens de homine dicitur, significamus aliquam perfectionem distinctam ab essentia hominis, et a potentia et ab esse ipsius, et ab omnibus huiusmodi. Sed cum hoc nomen de Deo dicimus, non intendimus significare aliquid distinctum ab essentia vel potentia vel esse ipsius. Et sic, cum hoc nomen sapiens de homine dicitur, quodammodo circumscribit et comprehendit rem significatam, non autem cum dicitur de Deo, sed relinquit rem significatam ut incomprehensam, et excedentem nominis significationem. Unde patet quod non secundum eandem rationem hoc nomen sapiens de Deo et de homine dicitur. Et eadem ratio est de aliis. Unde nullum nomen univoce de Deo et creaturis praedicatur.	I answer that, Univocal predication is impossible between God and creatures. The reason of this is that every effect which is not an adequate result of the power of the efficient cause, receives the similitude of the agent not in its full degree, but in a measure that falls short, so that what is divided and multiplied in the effects resides in the agent simply, and in the same manner; as for example the sun by exercise of its one power produces manifold and various forms in all inferior things. In the same way, as said in the preceding article, all perfections existing in creatures divided and multiplied, pre-exist in God unitedly. Thus when any term expressing perfection is applied to a creature, it signifies that perfection distinct in idea from other perfections; as, for instance, by the term "wise" applied to man, we signify some perfection distinct from a man's essence, and distinct from his power and existence, and from all similar things; whereas when we apply to it God, we do not mean to signify anything distinct from His essence, or power, or existence. Thus also this term "wise" applied to man in some degree circumscribes and comprehends the thing signified; whereas this is not the case when it is applied to God; but it leaves the thing signified as incomprehended, and as exceeding the signification of the name. Hence it is evident that this term "wise" is not applied in the same way to God and to man. The same rule applies to other terms. Hence no name is predicated univocally of God and of creatures.
Sed nec etiam pure aequivoce, ut aliqui dixerunt. Quia secundum hoc, ex creaturis nihil posset cognosci de Deo, nec demonstrari; sed semper incideret fallacia aequivocationis. Et hoc est tam contra philosophos, qui multa demonstrative de Deo probant, quam etiam contra apostolum dicentem, Rom. I, invisibilia Dei per ea quae facta sunt, intellecta, conspiciuntur.	Neither, on the other hand, are names applied to God and creatures in a purely equivocal sense, as some have said. Because if that were so, it follows that from creatures nothing could be known or demonstrated about God at all; for the reasoning would always be exposed to the fallacy of equivocation. Such a view is against the philosophers, who proved many things about God, and also against what the Apostle says: "The invisible things of God are clearly seen being understood by the things that are made" (Rm. 1:20). Therefore it must be said that these names are said of God and creatures in an analogous sense, i.e. according to proportion.
Dicendum est igitur quod huiusmodi nomina dicuntur de Deo et creaturis secundum analogiam, idest proportionem. Quod quidem dupliciter contingit in nominibus, vel quia multa habent proportionem ad unum, sicut sanum dicitur de medicina et urina, inquantum utrumque habet ordinem et proportionem ad sanitatem animalis, cuius hoc quidem signum est, illud vero causa; vel ex eo quod unum habet proportionem ad alterum, sicut sanum dicitur de medicina et animali, inquantum medicina est causa sanitatis quae est in animali. Et hoc modo aliqua dicuntur de Deo et creaturis analogice, et non aequivoce pure, neque univoce. Non enim possumus nominare Deum nisi ex creaturis, ut supra dictum est. Et sic, quidquid dicitur de Deo et creaturis, dicitur secundum quod est aliquis ordo creaturae ad Deum, ut ad principium et causam, in qua praeexistunt excellenter omnes rerum perfectiones. Et iste modus communitatis medius est inter puram aequivocationem et simplicem univocationem. Neque enim in his quae analogice dicuntur, est una ratio, sicut est in univocis; nec totaliter diversa, sicut in aequivocis; sed nomen quod sic multipliciter dicitur, significat diversas proportiones ad aliquid unum; sicut sanum, de urina dictum, significat signum sanitatis animalis, de medicina vero dictum, significat causam eiusdem sanitatis.	Now names are thus used in two ways: either according as many things are proportionate to one, thus for example "healthy" predicated of medicine and urine in relation and in proportion to health of a body, of which the former is the sign and the latter the cause: or according as one thing is proportionate to another, thus "healthy" is said of medicine and animal, since medicine is the cause of health in the animal body. And in this way some things are said of God and creatures analogically, and not in a purely equivocal nor in a purely univocal sense. For we can name God only from creatures (Article [1]). Thus whatever is said of God and creatures, is said according to the relation of a creature to God as its principle and cause, wherein all perfections of things pre-exist excellently. Now this mode of community of idea is a mean between pure equivocation and simple univocation. For in analogies the idea is not, as it is in univocals, one and the same, yet it is not totally diverse as in equivocals; but a term which is thus used in a multiple sense signifies various proportions to some one thing; thus "healthy" applied to urine signifies the sign of animal health, and applied to medicine signifies the cause of the same health.

To stress the point further, the use of analogy is so ubiquitous that we find it throughout theology, and not just in St. Thomas' discussion of divine attributes (which is perhaps the context in which philosophers use analogy the most).  

 

Analogy extends much further and is found in the discussion on the Trinity as well.  One example is St. Thomas' discussion on the "Son" as an "image" of the "Father." Those three terms are analogous: "Father," "Son," and "image" are being attributed to God, and therefore they have different (though related) meanings in God from the way they are meant when attributed to creatures.

 

The first point is regarding God as cause/principle. In order to understand St. Thomas' remarks on this topic, we need first to make an important distinction. And this distinction is not that between philosophy and theology. Philosophy indeed identifies God as the first cause. And so does theology. In doing so, philosophy and theology are speaking of the relationship between God and what is outside of God (ad extra). But theology also delves into God's inner life, what is to be found within God (ad intra). And within God, we find processions, where one person, the Father, is the first principle of the others. This procession ad intra is distinctly different from the causality of God ad extra. We can properly describe God's action ad extra as 'causation' or 'causality', but for the reasons St. Thomas gives, God's inner processions are best described as proceeding from aprinciple, rather than from a cause.

 

So, the take home message for beginners in theology: get used to analogy in theology!  It's everywhere!

 

http://iteadthomam.blogspot.com/2018/04/an-introduction-to-analogy-in-st-thomas.html

[Благовесник]

Toma Akvinski - Knjiga Protiv Zabluda Grka

https://www.scribd.com/document/54887455/Toma-Akvinski-Knjiga-Protiv-Zabluda-Grka

[Благовесник]

Е, ако је он глуп, стварно не знам ко је онда паметан. Био је веома просвећеног разума, једино што му се може донекле замерити јесте постојање сумње да се служио у пар наврата и непостојећим документима и цитатима да би оправдао средњовековни папски примат.

[Bokisd]

пре 1 сат, Благовесник рече

Е, ако је он глуп, стварно не знам ко је онда паметан. Био је веома просвећеног разума, једино што му се може донекле замерити јесте постојање сумње да се служио у пар наврата и непостојећим документима и цитатима да би оправдао средњовековни папски примат.

Imao je svoje momente, ... ali, osim primata, pitanje je i kako je shvatao netvarne Bozije energije i obozenje i slicno.