Apple odbio zahtjev da otkljuca ubicin Iphone

[Плутон]

https://twitter.com/mdowd/status/699943780808404993

[Juanito]

https://twitter.com/mdowd/status/699943780808404993

 

 

     

[Aquilius Cratus]

До пре неку годину је било апсолутно бесмислено говорити о много ствари, онда се појавили Сноуден и Асанж па испало много горе него што је било који заверолог и замишљао у својим најцрњим кошмарима.

 

Не радим то и не знам како се ради, нити ме уопште и интересује да улазим у то, али знам да се ради. Кажем ти оно што су ми причали људи који се тиме баве, а ти мисли шта год хоћеш, немам интереса да те убедим у супротно.

 

 A Snouden i Asanz ne mogu da lazu? Ni malkice? Ili ni malkice po ovim delikatnim pitanjima?

[RYLAH]

A Snouden i Asanz ne mogu da lazu? Ni malkice? Ili ni malkice po ovim delikatnim pitanjima?

Наравно да могу. Избор коме веровати је на свима нама, мислим да сам и то рекао горе.

Зато укрштај изворе па донеси одлуку.

[Juanito]

Али не могу све одлуке да се донесу на основу анализе изјава, неке морају и на основу анализе објеката из изјава. Сасвим је небитно шта владе, шијунске агенције, компаније и сноудени причају уколико је нека ствар физички или математички јако мало вероватна. Потпуно је невероватно веровање да владе и војске имају неку своју паралелну науку. 

[Аурор]

Mislim da je slucaj previse 'high profile' (iako San Bernardino u Srbiji jedva da je bio pomenut) da tek tako odbiju, ne znam...

Govorimo o telefonu teroriste i masovnog ubice.

[Juanito]

Mislim da je slucaj previse 'high profile' (iako San Bernardino u Srbiji jedva da je bio pomenut) da tek tako odbiju, ne znam...

Govorimo o telefonu teroriste i masovnog ubice.

 

Не говоримо само о том телефону (наслов ове теме је погрешан).

 

Прочитај.

 

http://www.apple.com/customer-letter/

[Аурор]

Не говоримо само о том телефону (наслов ове теме је погрешан).

 

Прочитај.

 

http://www.apple.com/customer-letter/

 

Pročitao sam.

 

Neka se nekako dogovore onda da možda otključaju taj jedan telefon i ne predaju taj software FBI-u uopšte. Neka ga čuvaju pod zemljom nakon toga...  Moraju da otvore telefon, nema druge. Mogu da otkriju celu mrežu terorista i spasu ko zna koliko života. 

[cloudking]

Pročitao sam.

Neka se nekako dogovore onda da možda otključaju taj jedan telefon i ne predaju taj software FBI-u uopšte. Neka ga čuvaju pod zemljom nakon toga... Moraju da otvore telefon, nema druge. Mogu da otkriju celu mrežu terorista i spasu ko zna koliko života.

A jel moze Apple da kaze "daj taj telefon ovamo" da ga odnese u podrum i da se posle par dana pojavi sa fleskom sa podacima sa telefona i da je da FBI-ju. Bez da iko ikada vidi ili sazna proces otkljucavanja?

[Juanito]

Ви бре ништа нећете да читате како треба. Поставио сам горе, а ево поново:

 

 

The first time you power up a new iPhone or iPad, you’ll be asked to set a passcode for unlocking your phone. This can be a full password or just a 4-digit PIN (though the former is certainly stronger). On devices with a Touch ID sensor, you’ll also be allowed to use your fingerprint as a more convenient alternative.

 

A passcode may look like flimsy security, but it’s not. The minute you set one, Apple’s operating system immediately begins encrypting your phone’s sensitive data—including mail, texts, photos, and call records—using a form of encryption that the U.S. government uses to protect classified military secrets. The key for this encryption is mathematically derived by combining your passcode with a unique set of secret numbers that are baked into your phone.

 

If all goes well, you’ll never notice this is happening. But the impact on data raiders is enormous. Even if someone cracks your phone open and attempts to read data directly off of the memory chips, all she’ll see is useless, scrambled junk. Guessing your passcode won’t help her—unless she can also recover the secret numbers that are stored within your phone’s processor. And Apple’s latest generation of phones makes that very difficult. Of course, your would-be data thief could try to get in by exhaustively trying all possible combinations, but according to an iOS security document, Apple also includes protections to slow this attack down. (In the same document, Apple estimates that a 6-digit alphanumeric password could take upward of five years to guess.)

 

The encryption on Apple devices is not entirely new with iOS 8. What is new is the amount of data your phone will now encrypt. Apple has extended encryption protections to nearly all the data you produce on a daily basis and will also require you to enter the passcode (or fingerprint) each time you reboot your phone. In addition, if you purchase a recent iPhone (5S, 6, or 6 Plus), Apple will store your keys within a dedicated hardware encryption “co-processor” called the Secure Enclave.

 

Taking Apple’s recent privacy announcements at face value, even Apple itself can’t break into the Secure Enclave in your phone. While it may seem “natural” that the designer of a system—in this case Apple—can break its own encryption, the truth is that such a capability is hardly an inevitable design outcome. For Apple to maintain such a capability with its newer security processors, it can’t just be more knowledgeable than its customers. It would have to literally design in a form of “skeleton key.” In computer security circles this mechanism is generally known as a “backdoor.”

Designing backdoors is easy. The challenge is in designing backdoors that only the right people can get through. In order to maintain its access to your phone, Apple would need a backdoor that allowed them to execute legitimate law enforcement requests, while locking hackers and well-resourced foreign intelligence services out. The problem is so challenging that even the National Security Agency has famously gotten it wrong.

To dive into the technical weeds, any backdoor Apple might design would likely require the company to store some sort of master access key—or even a whole database of such keys, one for every phone it sells. In the worst case, these keys might need to be carefully transported from the factory in China, to a locked and guarded room at Apple HQ in Cupertino, California. They would be kept isolated from the Internet to protect them from hackers, and Apple would have to constantly monitor its own employees to prevent abuse. None of this is cheap, and the stakes are high: A data breach involving Apple’s master keys could catastrophically harm the company’s reputation, particularly in the security-conscious enterprise market. 

***

Matthew Green is a research professor of computer science at Johns Hopkins University. His research focuses on applied cryptography and computer security. Follow him on Twitter.

Izvor

[Justin Waters]

Ne moze biti jasnije. Dakle, ma ko sta mislio ni NSA ne moze provaliti u enkriptovan iphone. 

[Аурор]

A jel moze Apple da kaze "daj taj telefon ovamo" da ga odnese u podrum i da se posle par dana pojavi sa fleskom sa podacima sa telefona i da je da FBI-ju. Bez da iko ikada vidi ili sazna proces otkljucavanja?

 

 

Ja ne znam, to bi možda bilo idealno.

 

Ali će da košta Apple i nosi bezbednosni rizik, pa su normalno oni protiv.

[Аурор]

John McAfee: “I’ll Decrypt San Bernardino Phone for Free”

http://thelibertarianrepublic.com/john-mcafee-ill-decrypt-san-bernadino-phone-for-free/

[Juanito]

John McAfee: “I’ll Decrypt San Bernardino Phone for Free”

http://thelibertarianrepublic.com/john-mcafee-ill-decrypt-san-bernadino-phone-for-free/

Си прочитао?

[Juanito]

Шта значи да ће да разбије енкрипцију "социјалним инжењерингом"?