Тероризам: узроци, последице и има ли лека

[Grizzly Adams]

ИД ће на крају морати војним путем да се реши, не знам да се са њима уопште могу правити било какви компромиси. Јер ИД је терористичка држава која никако не сме да постоји, што значи њено потпуно уништење. Ако не требају Амери и Руси то директно да реше, онда ће морати Сирија, Ирак и остали, само ако се сами не поџапају.

 

Мислим да ниси у праву. Да дођу на власт они би били слични осталим блиско-источним, северно-афричким и белосветским диктатурама. Проблем је код њих варварска и крвава "транзиција"...

[Баба]

Мислим да ниси у праву. Да дођу на власт они би били слични осталим блиско-источним, северно-афричким и белосветским диктатурама. Проблем је код њих варварска и крвава "транзиција"...

Свака држава данас, ма каква да је, па била и од људождера сачињена, мора имати сарадњу са другим државама у свету да би опстала. ИД већ има сарадњу са многим великим корпорацијама јер им по веома јефтиној цени продаје нафту.

Свима требају паре ма каква идеологија да је у питању.

 

Наравно ИСИЛ-у требају паре да би ширили своју безумну идеологију и терор, али како год требају им те паре.

А ако хоће паре у оној пустињи сем нафте и песка ништа друго немају, песак у тим количинама никоме не треба дакле остаје нафта.

 

Временом су многе диктатуре постајале на крају обичне демократије. Пример ето рецимо Шпанија. Џаба комунисти и грађански рат ништа нису успели да промене, а после свега Шпанија је данас једна обична демократија.

[Grizzly Adams]

Запад мора да се одлучи. Или ће да оставе Асада на миру и униште ИД или обрнуто. Треће је хаос и стална претња да манијаци побију цивиле у неком ресторану на Шанз-Елизеу... Овакво дивљање на Блиском истоку може да траје деценијама. Мислим, траје бре већ пар хиљада година... А као што знамо из личног искуства, најгоре за народ је кад се такав рат одужи.

 

Претпостављам на опште изненађење - мене је "обрадовало" кад су се Руси умешали јер они су јасно заузели страну и знају шта `оће.

 

Тј. није ме "обрадовало", најбоље би било да се нико не меша, али у тренутној ситуацији која не води нигде, то бар води неком решењу...

[Баба]

Овакво дивљање на Блиском истоку може да траје деценијама. Мислим, траје бре већ пар хиљада година...

 

Pa ne baš.

Sirija je bila veoma mirna i perspektivna zemlja. Praktično kao nekadašnja ex YU.

A "divljanje" od par iljada godina nije istorijski točno.

Recimo vo vremja Otomanske imperije bio je mir tamo vekovima.

U vreme Rimljana takođe( sem Jevreja, oni su pokušali dva ustanka i znamo kako se završilo).

itd.

 

Ali da je "prometan" taj bliski istok to jeste.

[Срђан Шијакињић]

Тешко је одупрети се атмосфери и одолети утиску да је баш данас свет у већој опасности него пре. Али Foreign Policy у овом занимљивом чланку каже да је током 70их и 80их година у Европи било више случајева тероризма и тероризмом изазваних смрти него од 9/11 до данас. Такође, у САД је од 9/11 наовамо више људи погинуло од не-муслиманских терориста него од џихадиста. 

 

Можда је тероизам само један појавни облик рата и уопште насиља, које је карактеристично за људе и којег никад неће нестати. Углавном, кога не мрзи, чланак је занимљив, нажалост на енглеском и нажалост ја немам времена да га преведем. Али ево:

 

VOICE

The Threat Is Already Inside

And 9 other truths about terrorism that nobody wants to hear.

• BY ROSA BROOKS
• NOVEMBER 20, 2015
•  
• 

By now the script is familiar: terrorists attack a Western target, and politicians compete to offer stunned and condemnatory adjectives. British, Chinese, and Japanese leaders thus proclaimed themselves “shocked” by the Paris attacks, which were described variously as “outrageous” and “horrific” by U.S. President Barack Obama; “terrible” and “cowardly” by French President François Hollande, “barbaric” by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, “despicable” by U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon and “heinous, evil, vile” by U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, who possesses a superior thesaurus.

The Paris attacks were all these things. One thing they were not, however, was surprising.

Occasional terrorist attacks in the West are virtually inevitable, and odds are, we’ll see more attacks in the coming decades, not fewer. If we want to reduce the long-term risk of terrorism — and reduce its ability to twist Western societies into unrecognizable caricatures of themselves — we need to stop viewing terrorism as shocking and aberrational, and instead recognize it as ongoing problem to be managed, rather than “defeated.”

Politicians don’t like to say any of this. But we’re not politicians, so let’s look at 10 painful truths.

No. 1: We can’t keep the bad guys out.  

Borders are permeable. The United States has more than 95,000 miles of coastline. Greece has 6,000 islands and some 10,000 miles of coastline. You can walk from Iraq and Syria into Turkey, and from Turkey into Bulgaria.Eight-hundred million people fly into U.S. airports each year, and 1.7 billionpeople fly into Europe’s airports. No wall can be long enough or high enough to keep out the truly desperate or determined, and there aren’t enough guards in the world to monitor every inch of coastline or border.

No. 2: Besides, the threat is already inside.

The 2005 terrorist attacks in London were carried out by British citizens, the Boston Marathon attack was perpetrated by a U.S. citizen and a U.S. permanent resident, and the Paris attacks appear to have been carried out mainly by French citizens. Every country on earth has its angry young men, and the Internet offers a dozen convenient ideologies to justify every kind of resentment. Adding more border guards — or keeping out refugees fleeing war and misery, as too many members of Congress seem eager to do — won’t help when the threat is already inside.

No. 3. More surveillance won’t get rid of terrorism, either.

As Edward Snowden’s 2013 leaks made clear, the United States is already surveilling the heck out of the entire planet, and so are half the governments in Europe. The trouble is, the more data you collect — the more satellite imagery and drone footage and emails and phone calls and texts you monitor — the harder it gets to separate the signal from the noise. The U.S. National Security Agency intercepts billions of communications each day, according to a Washington Post investigation, but despite sophisticated computer programs designed to detect “suspicious” activity, not everything can be analyzed — and a lot of time gets wasted on false positives.

Sometimes the authorities get lucky, and stumble on a plot before it can be carried out. Data from electronic intercepts, surveillance cameras, and the like often ends up being most useful after an attack, however: once the authorities know who they’re looking for, they can backtrack to gain a better understanding of how an attack came about, and they can sometimes link attackers to previously unknown plotters. When attacks are thwarted before they can be carried out, it’s usually as a result of the same factors that keep ordinary crime rates from going through the roof: good investigative work, vigilant communities, and bad guys who often make dumb mistakes.

No. 4. Defeating the Islamic State won’t make terrorism go away.

Don’t kid yourself. The Islamic State (IS) isn’t even the most lethal terror group operating today: Nigeria’s Boko Haram wins that title. Regardless, before there was IS, there was al Qaeda, which brought us 9/11 and the Madrid and London bombings; before al Qaeda there was Hezbollah and Hamas; and before Hamas there was the Abu Nidal group, Black Septemberand various other PLO factions. Europe saw more terrorist attacks — and more deaths from terror attacks — in the 1970s and 1980s than it has seen since 9/11. The Islamic State may now be the flavor du jour for the world’s angry young men, but if every single IS fighter in Syria and Iraq is obliterated, the Middle East will still seethe — and so will the banlieues of Paris.

And no, it’s not just Islam. Right-wing extremists in the United States still kill more people than jihadists. The 2011 attack in Norway — which left 77 people dead — was carried out by a single far-right terrorist, Anders Behring Breivik. Since 2006, more than half of all deaths in terror attacks in the west have been caused by non-Islamist “lone wolf” attackers, most motivated by right wing extremism or separatist sentiments. You can’t even count on Buddhists to be peaceful: on Oct. 23, 2012, for instance, Buddhists militants attacked the Burmese village of Yan Thei and massacred more than seventy people, including 28 children, most of whom were hacked to death.

No. 5. Terrorism still remains a relatively minor threat, statistically speaking.

That’s no consolation to the victims or their loved ones, but it might offer some solace to the rest of us. Those scary statistics you sometimes see about the alleged vast increase in global terrorism include attacks occurring in regions wracked by ongoing armed conflicts, such as Syria, Iraq, Nigeria, and Afghanistan. According to the 2015 Global Terrorism Index, between 2000 and 2014, only 2.6 percent of victims of terrorism lived in Western countries. Stay away from active war zones, and the average American is far more likely to be struck by lightning than killed by a terrorist. And gun violence in the United States? I won’t even go there.

No matter how you look at it, those of us who live in the West have it pretty easy. Gun violence in the United States notwithstanding, we live longer, we’re less likely to die of preventable disease, and we’re far less likely to die violently than those in non-Western countries. If you live in Iraq, Libya, or Syria — or Nigeria, Afghanistan, El Salvador, Honduras, or South Sudan — violent death is a constant possibility. If you live in Paris or Boston or Ottowa, relax.

No. 6. But don’t relax too much, because things will probably get worse before they get better.

From a historical perspective, the relative safety and security currently enjoyed by those in the Western world is anomalous. Until about 1850, life expectancy at birth hovered around 40 years in most of Europe; today, it’s over 80. The history of the West is every bit as violent as the modern Middle East, with brief periods of relative peace punctuated by periods of bloody conflict.

Don’t count on this period of relative Western safety continuing. Some day, the political, ethnic, and religious turmoil roiling the Middle East may end, but that day probably won’t be soon — and probably won’t be hastened by a more aggressive Western military campaign against the Islamic State.

If anything, the world is likely to see an uptick in violent conflict in the coming decades, and the West is unlikely to be fully spared. The Syrian refugee crisis has given Europe a taste of what can happen when substantial populations flee one region and try to settle in another. European border controls, refugee assistance systems and humanitarian instincts were quickly swamped by the sudden influx of more than 750,000 refugees, and though most of those refugees were exactly who they said they were,  a handful were not. Imagine what will happen a few decades down the road, as climate change fuels new conflicts over resources and vast populations move in search of a better life. One recent student suggests that portions of the Middle East will become literally too hot for human habitation by century’s end. What then?

No. 7. Meanwhile, poorly planned Western actions can make things still worse.

So in the wake of the Paris attacks, the fat, happy, over-privileged West wants to turn away the hundreds of thousands of desperate Muslim families seeking shelter and peace, just because a tiny fraction of those refugees might be militants? Islamic militants couldn’t ask for a better recruiting gift.

The same goes for stepping up military action against the Islamic State. If we respond to the Paris attacks by sending a large number of ground combat troops into Syria and Iraq, we once again become foreign occupiers — and big fat targets. If we respond by bombing every IS target we can find, odds are high we’ll end up bombing some people we never wanted or intended to bomb, and this won’t help us make new friends. Also, if we take out IS in Syria, we may just end up helping Syria’s other extremist rebels — or helping embattled Syrian president Bashar al-Assad, though it was Assad and other brutal regional leaders whose actions helped inspire and strengthen IS in the first place. Besides, what happens next in Syria, do we get rid of IS, or Assad? As Iraq should remind us, nature abhors a vacuum.

Military force can play a role in preventing and responding to terrorist attacks, but when we don’t know who to target and we don’t fully understand the regional dynamics, that role should be small.

No. 8. Terrorism is a problem to be managed.

I can’t believe it’s still necessary to repeat this, but… no, Fox News, we can’t “win” a “war” against terrorism or terror or terrorists any more than we can “win” a war on crime or drugs or poverty. But though we can’t eliminate all risk of terrorism, we can adopt sensible policies to reduce the risk and damage caused by terrorist attacks. We can fund moderate Muslim organizations that offer alternatives to extremist interpretations of Islam, for instance, increase law enforcement outreach in communities that are targeted by terrorist recruiters, and look for ways in increase community incentives to report suspicious activity — perhaps by exploring rehabilitation approaches to dealing with misguided teens who are attracted by violent ideologies but haven’t yet taken decisive steps to harm anyone. We can also look for reasonable ways to give additional tools to law enforcement officials, as long as we also add safeguards to prevent abuses. If we’re creative in our approaches, we can find ways to make terrorist attacks a little harder to carry out successfully, and make successful attacks less rewarding to those who carry them out.

No. 9: To do this, however, we need to move beyond the political posturing that characterizes most public debates about counterterrorism, and instead speak honestly about the costs and benefits of different approaches.

We can throw more border guards and bombs and police and TSA and NSA agents at the problem of terrorism, and some or all of these things may well buy down short-term risk, reducing the odds that terrorists will engage in successful attacks. But each of these approaches has costs, too, some financial and some human and political. More police might mean more thwarted terror plots, but ham-handed policing might mean more potential recruits for IS or its successor. More police will certainly mean higher public safety budgets, which, in a world of finite resources, means less money for something else. The same is true for airport security, NSA programs and airstrikes: if implemented poorly, they can cause a backlash, and even if implemented thoughtfully, they cost money, and take resources away from something else.

Fourteen years after 9/11, we still have astonishingly little empirical evidence about which counterterrorism techniques are effective and which aren’t. In large part, this is because governments haven’t made it a priority to fund or conduct evidence-based counterterrorism research. This needs to change.

We need to be hard-headed and unsentimental about this, just as we’re hardheaded about the prevention of crime, disease, car accidents, and a thousand other more run of the mill risks. How much do we think more police (or border guards or NSA programs or bombs) will make a difference, and at what point will we see diminishing marginal returns? At what point do we say: yes, we could reduce the risk of successful terror attacks by another 5 percent if we added five thousand more border guards, but the costs are just too high? Or even: we could reduce the risk by 85 percent if we turn France or the United States into police states, but we’d rather accept the added short-term risk than abandon the values that make our countries what they are?

No. 10. We need to stop rewarding terrorism.

We can change the cost-benefit calculus for would-be terrorists by reducing terrorism’s benefits as well as by reducing its costs. Terrorism is used by states and non-state actors alike both because its relatively cheap and easy, and because it works. From al Qaeda’s perspective, the 9/11 attacks were a spectacular success. The attacks cost the United States billions of dollars: we closed stock exchanges, halted air travel, and started expensive and inconclusive wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. From IS’s perspective, the Paris attacks are working, too: the anti-refugee backlash will aid IS recruiting, and tourism is taking a hit even here in the United States, where fear alone has led schools to cancel class trips to Washington. The more the West flails around with talk of bombs and border guards and police, the happier IS becomes.

The cheapest and easiest way to reduce the benefits of terrorism is to stop overreacting. That 129 people were killed in the Paris attacks is a terrible tragedy and a vicious crime, but 16,000 people in the United States aremurdered each year in “ordinary” homicides, 30,000 die in accidental falls, 34,000 die in car crashes, and 39,000 die of accidental poisoning. We should mourn each and every death, and we should take all reasonable steps to prevent more deaths from occurring and punish those responsible for intentionally inflicting harm.

But we need to stop viewing terrorism as unique and aberrational. The more we panic and posture and overreact, the more terrorism we’ll get.

LIONEL BONAVENTURE/AFP/Getty Images

Извор: http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/11/20/the-threat-is-already-inside-uncomfortable-truths-terrorism-isis/?wp_login_redirect=0

[Аурор]

Или ће да оставе Асада на миру и униште ИД или обрнуто.

 

Некако се чини да је Асад приоритет...  

 

ИД се и не бори против њега много, колико сам чуо, а Руси више бију ФСА и ове "умерене" исламисте/џихадисте него ИД (Арапи зову "Даеш").

 

 

Шта је са заливским земљама? Они имају укупно око 5 милиона војника, што не раде ништа? 

[Grizzly Adams]

The cheapest and easiest way to reduce the benefits of terrorism is to stop overreacting.

 

Управо тако!

 

Супер текст, хвала.

[Срђан Шијакињић]

Управо тако!

 

Супер текст, хвала.

 

Гуд ту хев ју бак

[feeble]

Запад мора да се одлучи. Или ће да оставе Асада на миру и униште ИД или обрнуто. Треће је хаос и стална претња да манијаци побију цивиле у неком ресторану на Шанз-Елизеу... Овакво дивљање на Блиском истоку може да траје деценијама. Мислим, траје бре већ пар хиљада година... А као што знамо из личног искуства, најгоре за народ је кад се такав рат одужи.

 

Претпостављам на опште изненађење - мене је "обрадовало" кад су се Руси умешали јер они су јасно заузели страну и знају шта `оће.

 

Тј. није ме "обрадовало", најбоље би било да се нико не меша, али у тренутној ситуацији која не води нигде, то бар води неком решењу...

Чисто сумњам да ће запад одустати од обарања Асада, кад су већ толико времена, новца и људских живота (добро, то је је најјефтиније, нису њихови људи) уложили у то. Руси су се укључили, као што сви знамо, због својих интереса. А мислим да је превасходно да им са југа не припрети некаква Франкенштајн држава која би настала ако Асад и САА буде поражени. Ту је вероватно улог и гасовод, који је један од разлога за ово дешавање у Сирији. У задње време ми се све више врзма теорија завере у глави, да је ово у Француској направљено да се запад и НАТО више активирају и помрсе рачуне Русима и врате ситуацију на стање пред руску интервенцију. Плашим се да ће се активније укључити  у рат, али сигурно неће помоћи Асаду да се реши ИД, Нусре и осталих фанатика. А мој омиљени муслимански учењак Имран Хосеин предвиђа да ће се ускоро ствари закомпликовати, чак са могућношћу нуклеарних сукоба. Надам се да ће моћници имати мало памети да до тога ипак не дође.

[Juanito]

 

Dobro, ovo je tacno sto je rekao, zemlje pune sektasa, plemena, generalno plemenske svesti  i da je problem sto su neobrazovani, a i kako bi bili kad su zabaceni u nekim pustarama iz kojih ne izlaze decenijama. 

 

Samo je pitanje kako resiti sve to.

 

Писао је о томе Фарид Закарија још 2004. Ал није било никог да чује...

 

Тhe Arab rulers of the Middle East are autocratic, corrupt, and heavy-handed. But they are still more liberal, tolerant, and pluralistic than those who would likely replace them. Elections in many Arab countries would produce politicians who espouse views that are closer to those of Osama bin Laden than those of Jordan's liberal monarch, King Abdullah. Last year, the emir of Kuwait, with American encouragement, proposed giving women the vote. But the democratically elected Kuwaiti par liament?filled with Islamic fundamentalists?roundly rejected the initiative. Saudi crown prince Abdullah tried something much less dramatic when he pro posed that women in Saudi Arabia be allowed to drive. (They are currently forbidden to do so, which means that Saudi Arabia has had to import half a million chauffeurs from places like India and the Philippines.) But the religious conservatives mobilized popular opposition and forced him to back down.

 

similar dynamic is evident elsewhere in the Arab world. In Oman, Qatar, Bahrain, Jordan, and Morocco, on virtually every political issue, the monarchs are more liberal than the societies over which they reign. Even in the Palestin ian territories, where secular nationalists like Arafat and his Palestine Libera tion Organization have long been the most popular political force, militant and religious groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad are gaining strength, espe cially among the young. And although they speak the language of elections, many of the Islamic parties have been withering in their contempt for democ racy, which they see as a Western form of government. They would happily come to power through an election, but then would set up their own theocratic rule. It would be one man, one vote, one time.

 

 

 

For the most part, the task of reform in the Middle East must fall to the peoples of the region. No one can make democracy, liberalism, or secularism take root in these societies without their own search, efforts, and achievements. But the Western world in general, and the United States in particular, can help enor mously. The United States is the dominant power in the Middle East; every country views its relations with Washington as the most critical tie they have. Oil, strategic ties, and the unique U.S. relationship with Israel ensure American involvement. Washington will continue to aid the Egyptian regime, protect the Saudi monarchy, and broker negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians. The question really is, should it not ask for something in return? By not pushing these regimes, the United States would be making a conscious decision to let things stay as they are?to opt for stability. This is a worthwhile goal, except that the current situation in the Middle East is highly unstable. Even if viewed from a strategic perspective, it is in America's immediate security interests to try to make the regimes of the Middle East less prone to breeding fanatical and terrorist opposition movements.

As a start, the West must recognize that it does not seek democracy in the Middle East?at least not yet. We seek first constitutional liberalism, which is very different. Clarifying our immediate goals will actually make them more easily attainable. The regimes in the Middle East will be delighted to learn that we will not try to force them to hold elections tomorrow. They will be less leased to know that we will continually press them on a whole array of other issues. The Saudi monarchy must do more to end its governmental and nongov ernmental support for extreme Islam, which is now the kingdom's second largest export to the rest of the world. If this offends advocates of pure free speech, so be it. It must rein in its religious and educational leaders and force them to stop flirting with fanaticism. In Egypt, we must ask President Mubarak to insist that the state-owned press drop its anti-American and anti-Semitic rants and begin opening itself up to other voices in the country. Some of these voices will be worse than those we hear now, but some will be better. Most important, people in these countries will begin to speak about what truly con cerns them?not only the status of Jerusalem or American policies in the Gulf, but also the regimes they live under and the politics they confront.

 

 

The more lasting solution is economic and political reform. Economic re forms must come first, for they are fundamental. Even though the problems facing the Middle East are not purely economic, their solution may lie in eco nomics. Moving toward capitalism, as we have seen, is the surest path to creat ing a limited, accountable state and a genuine middle class. And just as in Spain, Portugal, Chile, Taiwan, South Korea, and Mexico, economic reform means the beginnings of a genuine rule of law (capitalism needs contracts), openness to the world, access to information, and, perhaps most important, the develop ment of a business class. If you talk with Arab businessmen and women, they want the old system to change. They have a stake in openness, in rules, and in stability. They want their societies to modernize and move forward rather than stay trapped in factionalism and war. Instead of the romance of ideology, they seek the reality of material progress. In the Middle East today, there are too many people consumed by political dreams and too few interested in practi cal plans.

There is a dominant business class in the Middle East, but it owes its posi tion to oil or to connections to the ruling families.13 Its wealth is that of feudal ism, not capitalism, and its political effects remain feudal as well. A genuinely entrepreneurial business class would be the single most important force for change in the Middle East, pulling along all others in its wake. If culture mat ters, this is one place it would help. Arab culture for thousands of years has been full of traders, merchants, and businessmen. The bazaar is probably the oldest institution in the Middle East. And Islam has been historically highly receptive to business?Mohammed himself was a businessman. Ultimately, the battle for reform is one that Middle Easterners will have to fight, which is why there needs to be some group within these societies that advocates and benefits from economic and political reform.

 

 

If we could choose one place to press hardest to reform, it should be Egypt. Although Jordan has a more progressive ruler, and Saudi Arabia is more criti cal because of its oil, Egypt is the intellectual soul of the Arab world. If Egypt were to progress economically and politically, it would demonstrate more pow erfully than any essay or speech that Islam is compatible with modernity, and that Arabs can thrive in today's world. In East Asia, Japan's economic success proved a powerful example that others in the region looked to and followed. The Middle East needs one such homegrown success story.

 

There is another possible candidate for the role: Iraq. Before it became a playpen for Saddam's megalomania, Iraq was one of the most advanced, liter ate, and secular countries in the region. It has oil, but more importantly, it has water. Iraq is the land of one of the oldest river-valley civilizations in the world. Its capital, Baghdad, is home to one of the wonders of the ancient world, the Hanging Gardens of Babylon, and has been an important city for thousands of years. Iraq in the 1950s was a country with a highly developed civil society, with engineers, doctors, and architects, many of whom were women. Now that Sad dam has been dislodged, the United States must engage in a serious long-term project of nation building, because Iraq could well become the first major Arab country to combine Arab culture with economic dynamism, religious tolerance, liberal politics, and a modern outlook on the world. And success is infectious.

 

 

Finally, we need to revive constitutionalism. One effect of the overempha sis of pure democracy is that little effort is given to creating imaginative consti tutions for transitional countries. Constitutionalism, as it was understood by its greatest eighteenth-century exponents, such as Montesquieu and Madison, is a complicated system of checks and balances designed to prevent the accumula tion of power and the abuse of office. This is accomplished not by simply writing up a list of rights but by constructing a system in which government will not violate those rights. Various groups must be included and empowered because, as Madison explained, "ambition must be made to counteract ambition."

 

Constitutions were also meant to tame the passions of the public, creating not simply democratic but also deliberative government. The South African constitution is an example of an unusually crafted, somewhat undemocratic structure. It secures power for minorities, both those regionally based, such as the Zulus, and those that are dispersed, such as the whites. In doing so it has increased that country's chances of success as a democracy, despite its poverty and harrowing social catastrophes.

 

Извор

[feeble]

Sto se tice demokratije, bas me zanima da li bi pokusali da demokratizuju Saudijsku Arabiju da su Siriju sredili na vreme kako su ocekivali. Cisto sumnjam, ne znam da li su ikad realno kritikovali nacin vrsenja vlasti u SA, ukljucujuci odsecanje ruku, vesanje i ostale gadosti koje se tamo i dalje desavaju.

[Аурор]

It would be one man, one vote, one time.

 

 

Насмејао сам се гласно, али није смешно уопште...

 

Текст је добар, али не треба да важи само за Блиски Исток.

Свуда треба истицати (конституционални) либерализам пре демократије.

[Grizzly Adams]

Свуда треба истицати (конституционални) либерализам пре демократије.

 

Па да. Источна Европа је после пада комунизма упала у стагнацију и пропустила шансу да направи економско чудо зато што је комплетан фокус био само на "демократији", а либерализам је запостављен. И онда, у неком смислу с` правом, људи данас код нас кажу: "Ј.... ти демократију, ништа нисам од ње добио. Боље било код друга Тите." Јер нико им није објаснио да демократија нема никакве везе са благостањем. Није запад богат због демократије.

 

Како лепо рече Закарија и цитира Хуан:

 

The more lasting solution is economic and political reform. Economic reforms must come first, for they are fundamental. Even though the problems facing the Middle East are not purely economic, their solution may lie in economics. Moving toward capitalism, as we have seen, is the surest path to creating a limited, accountable state and a genuine middle class. And just as in Spain, Portugal, Chile, Taiwan, South Korea, and Mexico, economic reform means the beginnings of a genuine rule of law (capitalism needs contracts), openness to the world, access to information, and, perhaps most important, the development of a business class.

 

Мада је то сад друга тема, извин`те на дигресији.

[Аурор]

Па да. Источна Европа је после пада комунизма упала у стагнацију и пропустила шансу да направи економско чудо зато што је комплетан фокус био само на "демократији", а либерализам је запостављен.

 

А тек код њих како би било...

Има много текста, да не копирам све, погледајте истраживања мишљења у исламском свету:

http://www.thereligionofpeace.com/Pages/Opinion-Polls.htm

Демократија + ово =   ALLAHU AKBAR! 

[Grizzly Adams]

Овај инцидент се завршио срећно:
 

Man Shares Baklava With Airline Passengers Who Profiled Him

They made him open a small box he was carrying on the plane.
 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/southwest-airlines-discrimination_5650d583e4b0d4093a580544