Градови духова - државно планирање на делу

[florenntina]

"Само су две ствари бесконачне, Универзум и људска глупост, али нисам сигуран за ово прво."

Алберт Ајнштајн

ma...lako je njemu bilo da se pravi pametan kad mu je supruga bila Mileva... 0409_feel

[Grizzly Adams]

"Милева душо, која беше шеста децимала у Планковој константи?"

[Grizzly Adams]

Beijing's Empty Bullet Trains

Is China investing way too much in its infrastructure?

I recently took two trips to China just as the government launched its 12th Five-Year Plan to rebalance the country's long-term growth model. My visits deepened my view that there is a potentially destabilizing contradiction between China's short- and medium-term economic performance.

China's economy is overheating now, but, over time, its current overinvestment will prove deflationary both domestically and globally. Once increasing fixed investment becomes impossible—most likely after 2013—China is poised for a sharp slowdown. Instead of focusing on securing a soft landing today, Chinese policymakers should be worrying about the brick wall that economic growth may hit in the second half of the quinquennium.

Despite the rhetoric of the new Five-Year Plan—which, like the previous one, aims to increase the share of consumption in GDP—the path of least resistance is the status quo. The new plan's details reveal continued reliance on investment, including public housing, to support growth, rather than faster currency appreciation, substantial fiscal transfers to households, taxation and/or privatization of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), liberalization of the household registration (hukou) system, or an easing of financial repression.

China has grown for the last few decades on the back of export-led industrialization and a weak currency, which have resulted in high corporate and household savings rates and reliance on net exports and fixed investment (infrastructure, real estate, and industrial capacity for import-competing and export sectors). When net exports collapsed in 2008-09 from 11 percent of GDP to 5 percent, China's leader reacted by further increasing the fixed-investment share of GDP from 42 percent to 47 percent.

Thus, China did not suffer a severe recession (то значи да су је само одложили и увећали, ЗМ) —as occurred in Japan, Germany, and elsewhere in emerging Asia in 2009—only because fixed investment exploded. And the fixed-investment share of GDP has increased further in 2010-2011, to almost 50 percent.

The problem, of course, is that no country can be productive enough to reinvest 50 percent of GDP in new capital stock without eventually facing immense overcapacity and a staggering nonperforming loan problem. China is rife with overinvestment in physical capital, infrastructure, and property. To a visitor, this is evident in sleek but empty airports and bullet trains (which will reduce the need for the 45 planned airports), highways to nowhere, thousands of colossal new central and provincial government buildings, ghost towns, and brand-new aluminum smelters kept closed to prevent global prices from plunging.

...

Причитајте даље: http://www.slate.com/id/2291271/

[Grizzly Adams]

China’s coming collapse

China's $463 billion bail-out of local governments last week gave a good indication of how big its coming financial crisis will be — about 1.5 times bigger than America's.

It became clear last week that China has probably not dodged the financial crisis at all, after Beijing quietly bailed out local government to the tune of $463 billion.

Adjusted for the size of its economy, that rescue package is one-and-a-half times bigger than the Tarp bailout. That is particularly worrying, according to Dylan Grice, a global strategist at Societe Generale. “If we calibrate the magnitude of the economic crisis with the size of the bail-out, one-and-a-half Tarps implies a financial crisis one-and-a-half times the order of magnitude of 2008.”

http://www.financeasia.com/News/259864,china8217s-coming-collapse.aspx

[IvanJ]

Наручени чланак. Чуј ко им је саговорник! Наравно да им не одговара докапитализација домаћих банака и спасавање презадужених локалних буџета, јер онда њихове филијале у Кини добијају конкуренцију и морају да смање монополистичке интересне стопе. Кад би у Пекингу на власти био неки Динкић који би државне банке одвео у стечај и још субвенционисао потрошачке и најризичније кредите у привреди код страних банака, да видиш како би тај из "Сосијет Женерал" другачију песму певао - хвалио би кинеске власти на мудром кризном менаџменту. Лицимури западни!

[Михајло]

Како су Кинези направили милионске градове у којима нико не живи:

Кинези показују са оваквим примерима ступидност комунистичке идеологије...

Социјални инжењеринг (чији је ово покушај) се може спровести само уз прецизно планирање..по потребама...а не по жељама власти...

И паметније им је било да раселе милонске градове у ове празне..него да убијају своју пољопривреду...расељавајући сеоско становништво...